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THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO E-
COMMERCE AND LICENSING
Frangois Dessemontet*
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The Internet and the World Wide Web are widely seen as
an American invention, although some of its components have
been designed elsewhere (for example, in Geneva). Both its
early use among academics and the surge of electronic com-
merce since 1995 have been fueled by the American demand
for more efficient distance selling schemes and cheaper tele-
communications. Europe is lagging behind, as are the other
continents. In Europe we reach only one third of the U.S. turn-
over in e-commerce. I submit that legal issues are only a part
of the explanation for the late arrival of the European Union to
e-commerce. Some features of the tariffs on telephone lines
might explain why Internet use is not as affordable in Europe
as in the United States. For example, even local calls are not
included in the basic phone subscription price, and depending
where the surfer lives, he or she cannot even have access at
local call rates. Further, most of Europe is a very densely ur-
banized territory, in which people are physically near shops
and service providers. As a result, long-distance selling is not
as necessary there as it may be in Montana or New Mexico, or
in New York City at peak hours. From a more sociological
viewpoint, there is not one common language among Europe-
ans; businessmen often deal in English, but consumers may
rather shop in their mother tongue. There are around fifteen
main languages on the European continent, and eighty-three
altogether.'
Finally, the Euro has not yet become a fact of daily
life-as will be the case in 2002. The effect of erratic currency
exchange rates should not be underestimated. For example, the
brilliant book by Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace,2 costs thirty U.S. dollars plus shipping with Ama-
* Professor, Universities of Lausanne and Fribourg, Switzerland.
1. Tapani Salminen, UNESCO Red Book on Endangered Languages: Europe
(last modified Sept. 22, 1999) <http:/www.helsinki.fi/tasalmin/europe-index.html>.
2. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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zon.com. This amounts in January 2000 to 47.1 Swiss Francs
(at the rate of 1.57 Swiss Francs for one U.S. dollar), but some
time ago, thirty U.S. dollars were 33.9 Swiss Francs (at the
rate of 1.13 Swiss Francs for one U.S. dollar). This problem
does not exist for people who are paid or have bank accounts in
U.S. dollars. It does, however, make any order on the Net a bit
of a currency gamble for Europeans.
Now, the impact of most of these differences will lessen in
proportion to the increasing appeal of e-commerce. Although I
submit that factual differences might partially explain why
Europeans do not buy much on the Net, I also believe that
differences in our legal traditions are partially responsible.
Part One of this Article will first discuss these differences, and
then explore the current state of the law and the initiatives of
the European Union. Please pardon the very summary state-
ments in this short comparison. A more thorough discussion of
the complexities of European and U.S. law is beyond the scope
of this Article.
In Part Two, I shall report on the present state of affairs
in four areas of law regarding intellectual property transac-
tions: electronic signature, consumer protection, liability of
internet access and content providers, and finally, conflict of
laws. Of necessity, important issues-such as taxation, rela-
tionship with public authorities (for example concerning public
procurement), domain names, electronic payments, etc. will not
be touched upon.
I. EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS
A. Preeminence of Statutory Law
In the transatlantic dialogue, the United States relies on
self-regulation. Even the safe harbor privacy principles issued
as a draft by the Department of Commerce rely on the volun-
tary decision by private organizations to qualify for the safe
harbor.3 In the United States, consumer protection has been
enhanced, for example, by The Web Assurance Bureau-Online
Dispute Resolution.4 Consumer redress is also promoted
3. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
(visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http'//www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/Principlesll99.htm>.
4. See The Web Assurance Bureau (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http'//www.WebAssured.conaddress.htm>.
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through trade associations and chambers of commerce.5
The ill-fated attempt to adopt a new Article 2B of the
U.C.C. (even if not yet totally dead as the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act which has been introduced as a
bill in five states) shows that the U.S. has not yet resolved to
regulate by law, on a nation-wide scale, the basic issues raised
by contracting on the Net. The thirty-six state statutes on
digital signature evidence the fact that there is less reluctance
at the level of State legislatures, but their rules are fragmen-
tary.6 Common law will address the remaining issues.
But here is the first difference between the U.S. and the
European tradition: no common law of contract, libel, defama-
tion, or invasion of privacy exists in Europe. There is no com-
mon tradition, say, between France and Germany on the re-
quirement of writing. In France, this requirement is for eviden-
tiary purposes, but in the absence of a writing, no case could
be heard by a court of law if the contractual price is over 5,000
French Francs.' It is therefore not exaggerated to state that
all important agreements must be in writing. On the other
hand, Germany requires the written form as a precondition of
the validity of the contract, but for much fewer contracts.8
As there is no general statute of frauds in all European
countries, the requirement of writing can only be based on a
legislative or regulatory provision. Now, some thorough studies
have found that in Denmark for example, 4,000 legislative
provisions require the written form; if regulatory provisions
are added, there are approximately 10,000 rules that require a
deed to be in writing! In Switzerland, by contrast, the most
current listing of provisions requiring the written form would
encompass around twenty-five to thirty provisions plus some
specific laws.9 Thus, it is not possible to speak of a common
5. See generally Roscoe B. Starek III & Lynda M. Rozell, A Cyberspace Per-
spective: The Federal Trade Commission's Commitment to On-Line Consumer Pro-
tection, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 679 (1997); John Rothchild, Pro-
tecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J.
893 (1999).
6. See McBride Baker & Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital
Signature Legislation, State Initiatives (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http:J/www.mbc.com/ecommerce.html>.
7. See C. cIV. art. 1322 (Fr.).
8. See § 126 BGB (F.R.G.).
9. See, e.g., OR art. 14 (Switz.).
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tradition of civil law countries either as to the importance of
legal requirements for the written form or as to the number of
provisions on that topic. All other issues relating to contracting
on the Net might give rise to the same array of diverging rules.
Europeans, therefore, cannot rely on common law. U.S.
law professors may point to the market, or to the norms of self
regulating business associations as a substitute for legislative
measures. But to expect Europeans to rely on something other
than the legislature is to be blind to the absence of common
law in civil countries, where the only source of legal rule is the
legislature and where there are no common rules on the mar-
ket except those deriving from the Brussels authorities. We
also rely on these common rules to adopt the adequate frame-
work for e-commerce because there are no other European-
wide sources of rules or norms-and the code, that is the soft-
ware regulating the Net, is not in European hands. However,
because the European market is important, the Code develop-
ers will have to respect European provisions.
Finally, it should be recalled that the State is the most
important single entrepreneur in Western Europe. State eco-
nomic activities account for approximately a third to half of the
Gross National Product (before the privatization of telecoms
and other similar activities). The State's attitude towards the
Internet for its own business will be of paramount importance,
but this favors a regulatory approach.
B. Preeminence of European Law
The second salient feature of recent legal developments is
the unique relevance of Brussels' law, meaning the Directives
of the European Union as adopted by the Council of Ministers
in conjunction with the European Parliament (located in
Strasbourg). Of course, national legislatures may go ahead and
regulate electronic signatures, as Germany and Italy have
done in 1997.10 Germany just regulated certification authority
while Italy went a step further equating electronic signature
with handwritten signature." Nevertheless, the priority of
10. See Law of Electronic and Internet Commerce in Germany, art. 3 (visited
Mar. 4, 2000) <http'//www.iid.de/rahmen/iukdgebt.htm>; Italian Digital Signature
Legislation, art. 15 (visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http://mbc.com/ecom-
merce/legis/italy.html>.
11. See sources cited, supra note 10.
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European directives over the national laws is an important
constraint for national legislatures, which must adapt whatev-
er prior legislation exists to the newly adopted Directives. This
sounds familiar to U.S. citizens and Swiss nationals, since both
our constitutions are identical in this regard. Yet it is new to
most European parliaments, with the interesting side-effect
that many initiatives in the national legislature run into a
dead end because opponents may rightfully argue that it is
better to wait and see what will come from Brussels. This is
what happened to the French proposal on electronic signature
of September 1, 1999 adopted by the Government and dis-
cussed in the Senate but held back until the European Direc-
tive is definitively adopted. In other words, there is a good (or
not so good) reason for legislators to drag their feet, and stat-
utes on e-commerce may be more easily adopted in Singapore
than in Spain. This is not to say that existing laws can never
apply to e-commerce, but they are not tailored to its specific
needs. Therefore, it is only logical that the following detailed
presentation will focus on the European directives rather than
on national laws. Before turning to those particular issues,
however, I would finally stress that no European law professor
has ever advocated the total autonomy of cyberspace. The ideal
of cyber-anarchy is very much American-oriented.
Although Finland might boast to be the country of the
Linux inventor, and we have our share of gentle hackers, we
most generally believe in the State authority to rule against
pornography and revisionist or other hate sites. Let's imagine
the case of a virtual casino: in my view, Swiss law will be in-
fringed by a gambling scheme put on the Net by Swiss resi-
dents and accessible to Swiss residents who would not have
applied for the necessary authorizations-whatever the loca-
tion of the server. 2 Criminal law application is premised on
so many theories that there is always at least one good justifi-
cation to apply our criminal law, as in this case the principle of
universality. We do not smile about it as some U.S. citizens
smile or sneer about Colorado or Tennessee law as applicable
in cyberspace.
More generally, there is no basic objection to the State
providing a legal framework to e-commerce or to the honest
12. See RS 935.52 (Switz.) (federal law on gambling and casino).
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and fair dealing on the Net. Maybe the Internet is a sort of
Trojan horse, pushing American ideals of freedom of speech
and self-regulation on to the world platform while invading
other countries' legal order and basic convictions. If this turns
out to be so, however, our legislatures have not taken notice of
it yet. Although aware of possible conflicts, we Europeans still
believe in the traditional methods of solving conflicts of laws.
Somehow, we do not appear to believe that the surfers, and
especially the buyers, are on the Net outside the real space
world. Suppliers of course are transnational, but then they
already were in the last decades of the twentieth century.
Therefore, we naturally tend to apply the law of the consumer
rather than the law of the provider. This should at first limit
the invasion of U.S. law abroad. (In the long run, the Ameri-
canization of the world is a sociological phenomenon. At a time
when all of our younger attorneys and law professors hold a
U.S. LL.M. degree or come on sabbatical to Boston, Washing-
ton and San Francisco, how could our law not become Amer-
icanized?)
A tentative link can be sketched between the two atti-
tudes. By applying national law rather than some cyberspace
law that would of course be heavily influenced by U.S. law, we
try to keep some autonomy. By applying the consumer's law,
we apply European law in most cases where a U.S. supplier is
involved. But for how long can we check the advance of U.S.
notions of e-commerce? The question is moot. Legislative au-
tonomy is important inasmuch as it allows Europe to bargain
for fair terms and conditions when an international convention
of some sort will be prepared. Legislative autonomy is not an
end in itself, but a means to reach a balanced solution-for
contracting generally, for privacy, for intellectual property
protection and transactions, and for conflicts of law.
II. EUROPEAN SOLUTIONS
A. Electronic Signatures and E-commerce
Electronic signatures do not fulfill the requirement of
writing as provided under most European laws.13 An Europe-
13. See, e.g., § 126 BGB (F.R.G.); OR art. 14 (Switz.); C. civ. art. 1322-41
(Fr.) (although an interesting case holds that the PIN as used on banking debit
cards is a sufficient signature). See Cass. 3e civ. Paris, Nov. 8, 1989, D. 1990, 369.
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an Directive on a community framework for electronic signa-
tures was adopted on November 30, 1999."4 The goal of this
Directive is to ensure that e-commerce benefits from the inter-
nal European market, which requires a high level of uniformi-
ty be achieved in that sector. It does not purport to consolidate
all European texts bearing on e-commerce"5 and it does not
regulate the licensing transactions by way of separate provi-
sions. Of course, it is applicable to licensing agreements where
the national law requests the transfer or license of an intellec-
tual property right to be in writing (which is not the case for
licensing agreements in Switzerland," for example whenever
a trademark is transferred, a written deed of assignment or
other document must be filed with the Institute for Intellectual
Property').
The main distinction drawn in the Directive is between
14. See Common Position (EC) No. 28/1999 adopted by the Council on 28 June
1999 with a view to adopting Directive 1999/000/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Community framework for electronic signatures, 1999 O.J.
(C 243) 2, Annex I [hereinafter Common Position].
15. See Council Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, 1997 O.J.
(L 144) 19 [hereinafter Directive on Distance Contracts]; Directive 97/66/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, 1997 O.J. (L
24) 1; Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993
O.J. (L 95) 29; Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include
comparative advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18; Directive 98/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 87/102/EEC for the approxima-
tion of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning consumer credit, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 17; Council Directive 90/314/EEC on
package travel, package holidays and package tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59; Direc-
tive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer protec-
tion in the indication of the prices offered to consumers, 1998 O.J. (L 80) 27;
Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approxi-
mation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, 1998 O.J.
(L 213) 9; Directive 92/28/EEC of the Council on the advertising of medicinal prod-
ucts for human use, 1992 O.J. (L 113) 13.
16. For the latest case in this regard, see Trib. Commerce Berne, May 29,
1999, in REVUE DU DROIT DE LA PROPRtIk INTELLECTUELLE, DE L'INFORMATION ET
DE LA CONCURRENCE (ZEITSCHRIFT FOR IMMATERIALGOTER, INFORMATION UND
WETTBEWERBSRECHT) 657-59 (1999) [hereinafter REVUE].
17. See Federal Law on the Protection of Trademarks, art. 17, para. 2, and
Federal Ord. on the Protection of Trademarks, art. 28, para. 1(a) (available at
<http'//www.admin.ch/>).
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"electronic signatures" and "qualified certificates."18 Therefore,
it follows a two-tier approach. On the one hand, the electronic
signature is unique, and identifies the sender of a communica-
tion. It should also assure integrity of the text. It does, in other
words, certify that the sender has expressed his or her intent.
It serves both identification and authentication purposes. Nev-
ertheless, software used by the sender may be faulty or unpro-
tected. Thus, the electronic signature is not unquestionably
authentic. Only a qualified certificate may remove those
doubts. On the other hand, therefore, specific requirements for
security are to be met as per Annex I of the Directive.19
Understanding the difference between "simple electronic
signatures," even certified by a "cybernotary public," and "qual-
ified certificates" is essential when it comes to defining the
liability of the certifying authority (the so-called "cybernotary
public"). The first laws in Germany and Italy did not explicitly
address this distinction or which party would bear the in-
creased liability. Where the problem was thoroughly discussed,
as in Denmark, the enactment of this statute was stalled. It
may explain why Austria does not consider adopting the "two-
tier" approach to digital signature but relies instead on Art. 7
of the UNCITRAL Model law.2" Similarly, Switzerland re-
ferred to the general rules on liability of the Code of Obliga-
tions, but provided that the liability covers the link between a
public key and a given person at the time when the certificate
is issued."
Finally, a European Directive about e-commerce has not
yet been adopted because of diverging opinions between the
Council of Ministers and the Parliament. A new draft of this
Directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers on December
7, 1999, seven days after the Directive on Electronic Signature
was adopted. But the issues here are more those of consumer
protection, to which I now turn.
18. Common Position, supra note 14.
19. Id.
20. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
on the work of its twenty-sixth session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N.
Doc. A148/17, art. 7 (1993). The Model Law generally states that no recognition of
signatures must be denied simply because it is in electronic form.
21. See OICP art. 20 (Switz.) (available at <http://www.bakom.ch./>).
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B. Consumer Protection
Broadly speaking, consumer protection is needed for li-
censing transactions as well as for all other commercial opera-
tions. The "click-on" license and ensuing download are effectu-
ated for intellectual property rights as for any other goods or
wares. However, the peculiar nature of the software imported
into the computer of the buyer or licensee differs in three im-
portant ways from normal sales of goods on the Net.
1. Distance Selling
This is a revolution as far as intangibles are concerned. No
longer are intermediaries required. Cheaper prices will mean a
booming market for software and cultural goods. From a legal
viewpoint, although it is open to some doubts, most commenta-
tors appear to believe that the Directive on Distance Contracts
applies to licensing agreements." This is unfortunate in two
respects:
a) The idea that a separate written confirmation of the
order should be sent via telecopy or ordinary mail is
wholly inapplicable for most electronic licensing. There
is no practical way to keep records of the transaction
save on hard disk. Therefore, the draft Directive on e-
commerce provides that the provider is to give an easy,
direct and permanent access to some basic information
on himself,' and also that detailed information on the
method for keeping records if any must be given to the
licensee or buyer9-but no obligation to keep them is
provided, save for general terms and conditions.'
b) The right to rescind a distance sale within seven days
will be mostly inapplicable to the on-line licensing under
the Directive on Distance Contracts, because a general
exception to the right of rescission is provided whenever
the service is already used by the buyer.26 Thus, the
22. Directive on Distance Contracts, supra note 15, at 19.
23. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Certain
Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internet Market, 1999 O.J. (C 30)
art. 5 [hereinafter Directive on E-Commerce].
24. Id. art. 10.
25. Id. art. 11(2).
26. Directive on Distance Contracts, supra note 15. "Unless the parties have
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licensee who will usually use the softvare or other in-
tangible goods as soon as it is downloaded will not be in
a position to revoke the licensing agreement. I do not see
that a solution to that question is close at hand.
2. Conclusion of the Contract
The contract is formed when the buyer or licensee receives
notice through the Net of his or her acceptance by the provid-
er. When the licensee or buyer is not a professional having
entered an agreement contrary to that rule, the supplier or
licensor has to open appropriate, accessible and efficient means
for the consumer to become aware of his possible mistakes
during the preliminary steps leading to the click-on licensing,
in order for him to remedy them.
There is some drafting uncertainty under Article 11(2) of
the draft Directive for e-commerce, providing that "the seprice
provider shall make available to the recipient of the service
appropriate means that are effective and accessible allowing
him to identify and correct handling errors and accidental
transactions before the conclusion of the contract .... 27 This
should mean that an immediate cancellation of the order must
be possible if the order has been made unintentionally. More
importantly, the French Conseil d'Etat has suggested that a
hyperlink be created so that the professional codes of conduct
be embodied as General Terms and Conditions of the contract.
It is the first time to my knowledge that Terms and Conditions
have been seen as protecting the interests of the consumers.
Such a renewed confidence in General Terms and Conditions
could allow for the European law and the U.S. self-regulatory
approach to converge to a larger extent. But are there general
terms and conditions protective of the licensee, in fact? Not to
my knowledge.
agreed otherwise, the consumer may not exercise the right of withdrawal . . . for
the provisions of services if performance has begun, with the consumer's agree-
ment, before the end of the seven working day period . . . ." Id. art. 6(3).
27. Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 23, art. 11(2).
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C. Liability of Access and Site Providers
The draft Directive allows for a "mere conduit" exemption
of liability for access and site providers. 2' This is contrary to
the first reading of the Directive before the Parliament, and
the push to exempt the access providers is contrary to what
has been decided in a few cases. For example, the site provider
has been held liable in the Hallyday case in.FranceY.2 In Swit-
zerland, the general manager of a telephone company has been
sentenced by the Federal Tribunal for not stopping the exploi-
tation of phone sex accessible to minors.2
On the other hand, the German law on Electronic signa-
tures of 1997 also shields the access provider from liability if it
is unaware of the content of the information. I do not favor
such a broad exception.3 In my view, it all comes down to a
correct application of the fault requirement. If an access or a
site provider has knowledge or reasons to know that a site is
practicing swindle or fraud, contributory liability for fault may
be recognized. There appears to be no solid ground why Mem-
ber States should not continue applying their own standards of
fault or due diligence. The development of e-commerce does not
require any immunity of the very impressive groups like AOL
(merging with Time Warner) or Deutsche Telekom (merging
with Lagardbre), that do not appear to be menaced in their
existence by the usual rules on liability. Finally, in any civi-
lized society, those who engage in business have to bear the
risks of the peculiarities of their line of business, since they do
reap the benefits deriving from those peculiarities.
Of particular interest in this regard are the U.S. notions of
contributory infringement of copyright and of ancillary liabili-
ty.3 2 The French approach apparently accepts the notion of
28. Id. art. 12.
29. See Estelle Hallyday v. Valentin Lacambre, CA Paris, Feb. 10, 1999 (vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/il-
licite_divers/ca_100299.htm>. But see generally Lynda Lacoste v. Multimania Pro-
duction, T.GI., Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999 (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/responsabilitejug-tgi-nanterre_8l299.htm>.
30. See generally BGE 121 IV 109 (Switz.) (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.eurospider.ch/cgi-bin/ListBGEs3?path=/ext2/buge3/data/in-
dex/121indexIV.htm>.
31. Law of Electronic and Internet Commerce in Germany, art. 1 (visited Mar.
4, 2000) <http://www.iid.delrahmen/iukdgebt.htm>.
32. These issues were raised in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
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contributory liability, but the introduction of an ancillary lia-
bility (as in the area of the printed press) is barely men-
tioned.33
The likely effect of the draft Directive on e-commerce, if
adopted, would be to stifle the development of adequate reme-
dies against accomplices. Now this might appear to go beyond
the contractual topics which we discuss this morning, but it is
clear for every European practitioner that, as soon as a licens-
ee is exceeding the terms and conditions of the license agree-
ment, he is technically infringing the intellectual property
right. If the violation of the license agreement is, for example,
by way of dissemination of the licensed materials on the Net,
then the site providers or even the access provider should,
when at fault, be held liable if they undertake nothing against
this infringement. As Professor Lessig wrote, intermediaries
are pliant targets of regulation; 4 therefore it is better to aim
at them than at the individual users of copyrighted materials.
D. Country of Origin and Conflicts of Laws
The draft Directive on electronic commerce is premised on
the mutual recognition of information society services when
duly organized under their country of origin. "Country of ori-
gin" is nowhere defined for cyber-business, i.e. those virtual
facilities that outsource all handling of physical goods to third
firms. The country in which the hardware is located is of no
particular significance, as has been accepted for jurisdiction
purposes in U.S. and Swiss decisions."
The principle of country of origin is a fundamental one for
the European Union, since the Cassis de Dijon36 case and the
adoption of the directives on the corporations. Nevertheless,
many think that consumer confidence towards e-commerce can
be enhanced only if the consumer's own courts are competent
Line Communication Sevices, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
33.- See Letter from the Prime Minister to the Vice-President of the Council of
State and accompanying Report by the Council of State: Conducting of a study
into the Legal Issues Raised by the Development of the Internet, part IV (visited
Mar. 4, 2000) <http'/www.internet.gouv.fr/english/textesref/rapcegb/rapcegb.doc>.
34. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 50.
35. See the "Lyrics" decision by the Federal Tribunal in REVUE, supra note
16, at 635-36.
36. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral-AG/Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein v.
Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662.
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and his own law is applicable."
As for jurisdiction, Article 5(1) of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions (under revision) allow the court in the place of
performance of the contract to exercise jurisdiction." Howev-
er, Article 13(3) provides for the jurisdiction of the courts of
the consumer when a specific proposal or advertisement has
been made in the consumer's country of domicile and he has
performed the acts necessary to conclude the contract. 9
Now, when someone pulls from the Net an offer which he
then accepts, it is difficult to entertain the notion that a "spe-
cific proposal or advertisement" has been made in his country.
Therefore, the draft Directive is coherent with the Brussels
Lugano Conventions as they stand today. However, a draft
Article 13 has been proposed for the new Regulation which
should take the place of the Brussels Convention. The opening
of the national courts of the consumers for the litigations aris-
ing out of e-commerce would result from the revised wording of
Article 13(1)(c) requesting only that the seller (or licensor)
"directs [commercial or professional] activities to the [Buyer's
or Licensee's] State."4 ° Actually, the draft Regulation should
find a good deal of support. It is not fair to think of the con-
sumer who logs on to the Net as if he or she were going for a
weekend shopping spree to London or New York.4 Virtual
shopping is not real travelling, and therefore it should not
entail submission to a foreign sovereign's courts of law. Con-
versely, the licensor or supplier is reaping benefits from his
transnational activities. Therefore, he should be subject to the
37. See, e.g., OECD Forum on Electronic Commerce, Report on the Forum
(visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http'J/www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/itec/act/Paris-ecpdf/forum-re-
port.pdf> (offering a synopsis of Philippe Lemoine's speech at the October 1999
OECD Forum on Electronic Commerce). See also Jim Murray, The Proposed E-
commerce Directive and the Consumer, J. ADVERTISING & MARKETING POL &
PRACTISE IN THE EUR. COMMUNITY (1998).
38. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial
Judgments, 2 E.C. BULL. 22 (Supplement) art. 5(1) (1998) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters-Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, 1988 O.J.
(L 319) 9, 10, art. 5(1) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
39. Lugano Convention, supra note 38, at 12, art. 13(3).
40. See generally Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
COM(99)348 final.
41. Interestingly, this was an argument put forward in Playboy Enterprises v.
Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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jurisdiction of the consumer's country, as he did not restrict his
offer to a given territory or set of territories. If by his own
volition he sells or licenses abroad, there is no reason for the
foreign courts not to entertain claims against him. The only
exception could be when his offer is restricted to a given terri-
tory; then if he does not sell outside of those, he should not be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of other territories.
Article 5(1) of the present Brussels Convention embodies the
same idea when assigning jurisdiction to courts at the place of
performance of the contract (which of course is not a practical
test for software or other copyright licensing).42 Tentatively,
one could assert that "performance" means in this context the
downloading of the item in the licensee's computer.
As to the applicable law, the general rules of the Rome
Convention of 1980 (which is undergoing revision) would re-
quire that the law of the licensor's country be applied (as this
is stated in Article 122 of the Swiss Law of International Pri-
vate Law).4" There is again a specific provision for consumer
contracts.44
Besides more theoretical rationalizations, the usual justifi-
cation for the licensor's law to be declared applicable is to
increase the licensor's confidence in the solution of any possible
litigation, and hence encourage his willingness to part with his
absolute monopoly over a given intellectual right.4" However,
where mass transactions concerning software or infotainment
are at stake, there is no specific need for the licensor to have
confidence in his licensees. Rather, in order for e-commerce in
Europe to expand, the licensee's diffidence vis-h-vis the licensor
should be dissipated. Allowing for the application of the
42. Brussels Convention, supra note 38, at 22, art. 5(1).
43. Article 122 of the Swiss Law of Private International Law reads as fol-
lows:
1. Contracts on rights in intellectual property are governed by the
law of the country where the transferor or licensor has his habitu-
al residence.
2. A choice of law is permitted.
SR 291.435.1 (Switz.).
44. Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for
signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, art. 5 [hereinafter Rome
Convention].
45. Francois Dessemontet, Transfer of Technology under UNCTAD and EEC
Draft Codifications: A European View on Choice of Law in Licensing, 12 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1977).
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licensee's law could encourage this. For example, the most
interesting questions about the liability of the licensor are not
to be left to the licensor's law. If, for instance, a self-destroying
software explodes and damages important data of the licensee,
when the licensor happens to live in a country where conse-
quential damages are strictly limited to the amount which was
foreseeable, the consumer will have little redress for the harm
inflicted upon him. Article 74 of the Vienna Convention on the
Sales of Goods is not applicable to consumers dealings (and
probably not to licensing either, although there is a strong
trend in Europe to re-qualify some licensing on basic software
as "sale"--thus depriving the licensor of his claims on many a
restriction enumerated in the transfer agreement).46 In my
view, for licensing agreements as for other harmful behaviors
on the Net (infringement on the right of privacy, on the right
of publicity, defamation, libel, swindle, etc.), the applicable law
should be established by the following criteria, in order of
preference:
a) the law chosen by the parties;
b) the law of the licensee;
c) the law of the place of performance if different from (b)
or if (b) is not to be found (e.g. because the licensee is
anonymous or is a cyber-space firm with no fixed loca-
tion);
d) the law of the licensor.
In the future, closed-system dealings on the Net will be as
important as open business transactions. Therefore, party
autonomy should prevail between licensor and licensee.
If, as is common, no choice of law has been made for con-
sumer transactions, there are good grounds to protect the con-
sumer and apply its law. It is more a matter of psychological
enhancement of the consumers' confidence. The real effect
should not be to cripple the entrepreneurs on the Net. To the
46. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 72 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988).
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extent business-minded entrepreneurs would stop to consider
issues of conflicts of law, they would also be advised that the
licensing laws of most countries are similar-since almost
everywhere there is no restatement or compilation of the pri-
vate law of licensing which is judge-made law.
Going back to the basics, the choice of the law of the per-
formance of the specific obligation under Article 4 of the Rome
Convention can be explained by the fact that the provider of
services or supplier of goods is organized in a given environ-
ment.47 In former times, he was organizing his activities tak-
ing into account the legal rules and liability in this environ-
ment. And in the event of litigation he would be exposed to
bankruptcy proceedings or seizure in that country. Now the
virtual corporation has few assets, since it outsources most of
its commercial activities, and the first consideration-which is
far more important-does no longer hold true: in cyberspace
the supplier is not mainly organized according to a real space
territory. Thus, there is no need to submit the contract to the
supplier's law. This is the great difference with most licensing
agreements outside e-commerce.
CONCLUSION
In this regard, Professor Nimmer's gallant effort to restate
the law of licensing in the ill-fated U.C.C. Article 2B should be
a source of inspiration for lawyers all across the world who
must deal with licensing issues. Never could one read such
minute provisions on the various issues raised by licensing, for
example, lien or pledges on licensing rights.48 Further, let me
say that many if not most European intellectual property
scholars do not share the concern of those who, in the United
States, believe that the Constitution would forbid private par-
ties to come to an agreement protective of some rights outside
the statutory protection. Private autonomy stands over the
goals that are assigned by the promoters of the law and eco-
nomics approach to the copyright law and other intellectual
property statutes.
1. First, the very existence of a well-developed body of
unfair competition law supplementing the unavoidable
47. Rome Convention, supra note 44, art. 4(2).
48. See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act §§ 507, 508 (1999).
[Vol. XXV:J
E-COMMERCE AND LICENSING
loopholes of the statutory intellectual property rights
prevents Europeans from viewing the legislative protec-
tion of IP rights as an implicit exclusion of all other pro-
tection by means of contractual rights.
2. Second, at a time of deregulation, when the State is back
to assume its most important functions, leaving the
promotion of the economy to the market (not abandoning
the police of the market place, thus consumer and priva-
cy protection, of course), it is only fair that private citi-
zens can organize the apportionment of rights among
themselves by agreement.
3. Finally, there is a whole dimension missing from the
U.S. law and economics approach to intellectual property
rights: it is not only the U.S. Constitution that sets the
framework for the protection of intellectual property
rights. In addition to Constitutional protections, the
United States is a signatory to the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which states: "The State Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone.., to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author."49 Additional protection is also
provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
to quote: "Everyone has the right to the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientif-
ic, literary or artistic production of which he is the au-
thor."50
When considered in that light, the right of IP rights-hold-
ers to organize their commercial activities as they see fit, so
long as they find partners to transact business with, cannot be
curtailed by the purpose of the IP statutes.5 ' Even if it were
found to exist, a public policy based on those statutes could not
49. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15,
G.A. Res. 2200A, Dec. 16, 1966.
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. I, 183d plen. mtg. at 71, art. 27(2), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
51. For a different opinion, see generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
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override basic human rights that are ensconced in a text rati-
fied by the United States.
The only recourse could be to notions such as the patent
misuse of Section 271 of the U.S. Patent Act,52 or to the fair
use provision of the Copyright Act, or more generally to the
provisions of the antitrust laws. As has been pointed out, you
cannot so easily accept that the licensee "clicks away" fair
use5 -- but most of the European laws' limitations of copyright
are not mandatory in my view: licensors and licensees can
establish their own regulations for themselves, disregarding
the limitation to the copyright that benefit all people not
bound by contract.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1998).
53. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 197.
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